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The Business Corporations Act of New Brunswick: 
Observations From A Management Perspective
R. BRUCE EDDY*
New Brunswick has followed the lead of other Canadian jurisdictions 
by adopting a business corporations statute that simplifies the routine 
administration of corporate affairs while enlarging management ac­
countability to shareholders and creditors. The author examines the 
new Business Corporations Act concentrating on the impact o f the 
new proxnsions on directors, officers and controlling shareholders and 
highlighting the factors to be considered in the transition period during 
which letters patent companies may choose between remaining under 
the old legislation and continuing under the new.
Se conformant à la direction de certaines juridictions canadiennes, le 
Nouveau-Brunswick a adopté une loi portant sur les corporations 
commerciales. La nouvelle Loi sur les corporations commerciales 
simplifie les affaires courantes des corporations tout en augmentant la 
responsabilitié de la gérance envers les actionnaires et les créanciers.
L ’auteur étudit l’effet de ces nouvelles dispositions vis-à-vis les 
administrateurs, les dirigeants et les actionnaires majoritaires, en sou­
lignant les éléments à considérés durant le période de transition. 
Pendant cette periode, les corporations formées en vertu des lettres 
patentes peuvent choisir de demeurer sous l ’ancienne loi ou de suivre 
la nouvelle loi.
Starting in January, 1982, a new regime for business corporations 
takes effect in New Brunswick. T he provisions o f the new Business 
Corporations Act (“New Act”)1 are to be introduced in stages over five 
years. After December 31, 1981 no letters patent incorporating a company 
may be issued2 under the Companies Act3 (“Old Act”); new trading cor­
porations must be incorporated under the New Act. However, there is a 
two year delay during  which the charters o f existing letters patent 
companies may be am ended by supplementary letters patent.4 During 
this period, companies incorporated prior to January 1, 1982 may be 
“continued” under the New Act.5 On January 1, 1987, all companies
*B.A., LL.B. (Q ueen 's), M.A. (Oxon). Barrister and Solicitor, Eddy & McEbnan, Fredericton, N.B.
'S .N.B. 1981, c. B-9.1. (New Act).
'Ibid., s. 192 (6); S.N.B. 1981, c. 12, s. 1.2(1)
»R.S.N.B. 1973, c. C-13.
4S.N.B. 1981, c. 12, s. 1.2 (2).
•Supra, footnote 1, at s. 192.
108 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL •  REVUE DE DROIT U.N.-B.
incorporated in New Brunswick with share capital (with the exception of 
certain co-operatives, credit unions and savings and loans societies) will 
be deemed to have been continued under the New Act.6
The New Act follows the model of the Canada Business Corporations 
Act (“CBCA”)7 but, in several im portant respects, departs from that 
model. Some of these departures stem from the Province’s desire to 
attract extra-provincial investment and business initiatives, others result 
from the size of the jurisdiction. A preponderance of closely-held com­
panies and somewhat limited government resources militate against the 
more complex securities provisions found in other business corporations’ 
statutes. In addition, however, the New Act introduces several novel 
concepts8 that are hard to trace to administrative expediency and, far 
from attracting foreign investment, appear to discourage it. The follow­
ing discussion is intended to highlight the impact of the more salient 
features of the New Act from the point of view of the management of 
companies proposing to incorporate or continue under the New Act and 
to provide some practical suggestions to assist in making the decision 
whether to continue.
Election of Directors
The New Act, like that of other jurisdictions following the CBCA 
model, has made “one-man companies” possible. No company governed 
by the New Act need have more than one director9, nor does that 
director have to hold a qualifying share.10 This is merely an acknowl­
edgement that in many closely-held companies two of the minimum of 
three directors (required under the Old Act) added nothing but incon­
venience and expense to the administration of the company. Because 
New Brunswick’s New Act does not generally distinguish between public 
and private companies, even a publicly-traded New Brunswick company 
could conceivably have but a single director. The num ber of directors 
may be a fixed num ber or a minimum and maximum num ber.11
The precise size of the board of directors takes on more significance 
in New Brunswick than under the CBCA because of the mandatory 
cumulative voting prescribed by section 65 of the New Act. U nder the
•Ibid., at s. 2(1) (c).
»S.C., 1974-75. c. 33.
•The main feature o f the New Act that would be seen as a deterrent to foreign investment made 
through corporations governed by the New Act is s. 83 which deals with insider trading. See Infra 
under the tide “Insider T rading”.
*Supra, footnote 1, at ss. 60(1) & 72 (7).
"¡Ind., at s. 63(2).
"Ibid., at s. 4 (1) (e).
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Old Act, section 92 contained a form of cumulative voting for directors 
that could be invoked by a shareholder or a group of shareholders acting 
as a unit. Any shareholder wishing to take advantage of this provision 
was required, prior to the election o f a full board o f directors, to deposit 
a declaration indicating his intention to invoke the right to elect one 
director.
The provisions of section 92 of the Old Act were defective in at least 
one respect in that if the elections of directors were staggered, it could 
not be said that a full board of directors was to be elected at any particular 
meeting. In the absence of the meeting held to elect a full board, one of 
the pre-requisites of section 92 would not be met and the cumulative 
voting provisions would not apply. The maximum period for which a 
director could be elected was two years so that staggering was possible. 
U nder the New Act the staggering of elections of directors is not pro­
hibited but since the maximum term for which a director may be elected 
is 15 m onths12, it would be necessary to have one or more elections of 
directors between annual meetings in order to stagger the terms.
The New Act affords to shareholders cumulative voting rights each 
time directors are to be elected by the shareholders whether or not a 
full board is to be elected. Thus, a holder of 20% of the voting shares 
is entitled to elect two directors on a board of ten and at least one 
director on a board o f more than four and less than n ine.13 T he 
cumulative voting rights are reinforced by limitations on removal of 
directors by the shareholders14 and on the reduction o f the board.15
The cumulative voting provisions of the New Act cannot be direcdy 
excluded by the articles nor does there appear to be a convenient way 
to assure to a majority shareholder the power to select a percentage of 
the board greater than the percentage he would be entitled to under the 
cumulative voting provisions. If  it is necessary to eliminate cumulative 
voting, consideration might be given to creating two classes of shares 
differing only with respect to rights to elect directors.16 Conceivably the 
same result could be achieved by creating in the articles a separate class 
of redeemable qualifying shares, stipulating that each director must hold
"lb%d., at s. 65(5).
1’Section 65 (1) operates so that the num ber o f votes required to assure the election o f one director on 
a board o f two is H of the total votes plus one; for one director out o f three, Y* o f the votes plus one 
are required; for one director out o f four, H of the votes plus one are required. Similarly, for two 
directors out o f Five, H of the votes plus one are required. However, if the extra vote is missing the
result may be a tie and the mathematical rule will not hold unless the Chairman casts a deciding vote 
in favour of the majority shareholder’s nominees to break the tie.
'*lbtd., at s. 65 (6).
"Ibtd., at s. 70 (2).
"Ibid., at s. 67 (2).
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a qualifying share17, and by restricting the transfer18 and issue19 of 
qualifying shares so that the majority shareholder can, in effect, prevent 
the minority shareholder’s nominees from continuing to hold or from 
acquiring the necessary qualification.
Qualifications of Directors
In prescribing the qualifications of directors the New Act20 is both 
more and less restrictive than the CBCA.21 The age requirem ent is 
nineteen years under the New Act compared to eighteen years under 
the CBCA. More important, the New Act does not impose any residence 
or citizenship qualifications whereas the CBCA22 calls for a majority o f 
the directors to be “resident Canadians” (defined so as to exclude some 
residents who are not Canadian citizens). The New Act imposes an extra 
requirem ent not found in the CBCA: no person may be a director who 
has been recently convicted o f an offence under the Criminal Code 
involving fraud or in connection with the prom otion, form ation o r 
management of a corporation to which the New Act applies and for 
which he has not been pardoned.23 Somewhat anomalously, a person 
convicted under the laws of a non-Canadian jurisdiction for an offence 
such as securities’ fraud involving a New Brunswick corporation would 
appear to qualify as a director in New Brunswick whereas a conviction 
for the same offence under the Criminal Code would disqualify him. 
The disqualification does not appear to extend to a person convicted of 
a securities’ offence in respect of corporations to which the New Act 
does not apply unless the offence involved fraud.24
While the share qualification has been removed unless the articles 
otherwise provide, a director is not a director unless he was present at 
the meeting at which he was elected or appointed and did not refuse to 
act as a director or, if he was not present at the meeting, he consents in 
writing to act as a director within ten days after his election or appoint­
ment or he acts as a director pursuant to his election or appointment. 
Since a first director is not elected or appointed, but named by the 
incorporators of the company25 there is no requirem ent that he consent
'»I b t d at s. 63 (2)
"Ibtd., at s. 50(1).
'•Ibid., at s. 23 (1).
,#Ibid., at s. 63.
“ S.C., 1974-75. c. 33. s. 100. 
u lbtd., at »s. 100 (3) Sc 2 (1).
**,Supra, footnote 1, at s. 63 (1) (e).
i*lbid., at s. 1 (1) (definition o f "corporation”).
” Ibtd., at ss. 64 (2) & 64 (3).
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to act as a director; he holds office from the issue of the certificate of 
incorporation until the first meeting of shareholders.
Meetings of the Board
All meetings of directors may be held outside the Province if the by­
laws so permit. U nder the Old Act this permission had to be included 
in the letters patent.26 Unless the by-laws otherwise provide, the minimum 
notice required for a meeting of the board of directors is seven days.27 
A quorum  for a d irectors’ m eeting may be any num ber from  one 
upwards; however, unless the articles or by-laws specify otherwise, a 
majority constitutes the quorum .28 Telephone meetings are perm itted.29 
There was some doubt under the Old Act whether such meetings con­
stituted proper meetings. T he question was canvassed in a British Colum­
bia case, re Bankruptcy of Associated Color Laboratories Ltd. 29a After reviewing 
the authorities, Mr. Justice MacDonald held in that case that because the 
articles of association of the company in question did not specifically 
contemplate meetings of directors by telephone, resolutions purportedly 
adopted during telephone conversations between the directors were not 
valid. U nder the New Act the meeting by telephone is valid if all those 
participating can hear each other and either the by-laws permit telephone 
meetings or, where not prohibited by the by-laws, if all the directors of 
the corporation consent. It seems prudent therefore to include a provi­
sion in the by-laws, permitting such meetings so that those not partici­
pating need only waive notice o f the meeting, and no separate consent 
is necessary for each such m eeting.30
Signed Resolutions
Directors may pass resolutions by means of signed instruments in 
writing. The directors need not all sign the same instrument—signed 
counter-parts are permissible.31 However, all directors in office, not just 
a majority or a quorum of the board, must sign the resolution. The same 
procedure is permitted by the CBCA for both directors and shareholders 
Dut without reference to counter-parts.32 The New Act unfortunately is
u Supra, footnote 3, at s. 43 (c).
"Supra, footnote 1, at s. 72 (4).
*•I M ., at s. 72(3).
*•Ikd ., at ». 72(8).
(1970). 73 W.W. R. (N.S.) 556.
**cf. CBCA supra, footnote 7, s. 109(9), which requires the consent o f all directors to the holding of 
telephone meetings (this consent is often included in the waiver of notice o f the meeting).
''Supra, footnote 1, at s. 75(1). The corresponding provision for shareholders’ meetings is contained in 
section 95(1) o f the New Act.
**Supra, footnote 7, ss. 112 (directors) 136 (shareholders).
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unclear on the effect of such resolutions. The procedure is prescribed 
for first directors33, directors generally,34 and for shareholders35. But 
only with respect to a resolution signed by the first directors is the 
resolution deemed to be as valid as if it had been passed at a meeting 
duly convened and held. U nder The Business Corporations Act o f Ontario 
both shareholders’ and directors’ signed resolutions are stated to be “as 
valid and effective as if passed at a meeting . . .  duly called, constituted 
and held . . .”3#. Because of the omission o f these words from the New 
Act with respect to resolutions o f perm anent directors and o f sharehold­
ers the validity o f signed resolutions will be questionable in circumstances 
where there are special notice requirements. In the usual case, where the 
article and by-laws do not address the issue o f what is to be contained 
in the notice, the contents of the notice of a directors’ meeting will not be of 
great importance but for shareholders’ meetings the contents of the 
notice is often significant.37 Section 95 (2), which concerns only share­
holders’ meetings, may not be adequate to resolve the question o f validity 
o f signed resolutions as a substitute for meetings in respect o f which 
notice would normally be given o r waived. It states:
“A resolution in writing dealing with all matters required by this Act to be 
dealt with at a meeting of shareholders, and signed by all the shareholders 
entitled to vote at that meeting, satisfies all the requirements of this Act 
relating to meetings of shareholders.”
Even if by signing the shareholders’ resolution a shareholder waives 
notice of any special business to be transacted it is unlikely that the 
signatures of all shareholders was intended to constitute waiver on the 
part of a director or the auditor, each o f whom is entitled to notice of 
shareholders’ meetings in certain circumstances.38 Section 95 (2) may be 
concerned only with the business at the meeting rather than the notice 
calling it. The most cautious approach in cases where there are special 
requirements as to the contents of a notice or as to those entitled to 
receive notice is to hold a meeting in the usual way rather than act by 
signed resolution. Nevertheless, if the resolution itself gives all the infor­
mation required to be contained in the notice it is difficult to see how 
the written resolution procedure could be impugned as long as all those
**Supra, footnote 1, at s. 62(6).
**lbtd., at s. 75(1).
"Ibid., at ss. 95(1) & 95(2).
»•R.S.O. 1980, c.54, ss. 22(1) & 22(2).
aTFor shareholders’ meetings the New Act imposes special requirements as to the notice calling the 
meeting where a shareholder proposal is to be made (s. 89(2)), o r if special business is to be transacted 
(s. 87(5)) such as where a director's interest is to be declared (s. 77(9)), o r amendments to the artides 
are proposed (s. 114(2)), o r an amalgamation is to be considered (s. 122(2)).
’•Each director is entitled to notice and to be heard at shareholders' meetings: supra, footnote 1, at s. 
68. T he auditor is entitled to notice of and to attend the annual meeting o f shareholders: ibid. at s.
109(1).
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entitled to notice of (and not just those entitled to vote at) the meeting 
signed the resolution and waived notice of the business to be transacted.
Conflict of Interest
Like the CBCA39, a director or officer who is a party or who is 
himself not a party but has a material interest in a person, firm or 
corporation that is a party to material contracts involving the corporation 
is required to disclose the nature and extent o f his interest.40 The 
disclosure is, generally-speaking, to be made at the earliest opportunity. 
An interested director is not counted in the quorum and may not be 
present or vote on any resolution approving the contract except where 
the contract is for directors’ indemnity or insurance, for his rem unera­
tion, for security for the company’s obligations, or a contract with an 
affiliate. A general notice by the director or officer with respect to all 
contracts made or to be made with the corporation by a particular person, 
firm or corporation is sufficient. Giving a general notice does not however 
enable the director to vote or to be counted in the quorum  at the meeting 
at which the contract is to be considered.
A failure to disclose to the directors will make the interested director 
or officer liable to account for any profit made on the contract unless 
the contract is confirmed or approved by a majority of the votes cast by 
disinterested shareholders at a general meeting duly called for that 
purpose and, in the case of a director, if the nature and extent of the 
director’s interest are disclosed in reasonable detail in the notice calling 
the meeting.41 The New Act appears to distinguish in sub-section 77 (9) 
between directors and officers, in that a director but not an officer, is 
required by that sub-section to disclose the nature and extent of his 
interest in the notice calling the meeting. Since sub-section 87 (5) of the 
New Act requires that the notice of a meeting of shareholders at which 
special business is to be transacted state the nature of the business in 
sufficient detail to permit the shareholder to form a reasoned judgm ent 
thereon, it is arguable that even an officer must disclose the nature and 
extent of his interest in the notice calling the meeting if only to enable 
the shareholders to make a reasoned judgm ent on the contract in issue.
Once the officer or director has made the appropriate disclosure to 
the directors he still has to put the contract to the disinterested share­
holders unless the officer or director establishes that the contract was 
reasonable and fair to the corporation at the time it was approved.42
“ Supra, footnote 7, at s. 115.
**Supra, footnote 1, at s. 77. 
*'lbtd., at s. 77(9). 
at s. 77(7).
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While accountability by the director is removed by such shareholder 
ratification, the Court may nevertheless set aside the contract if disclosure 
was not made to the directors as required by section 77.43 The practical 
result is that where a majority shareholder with control of the board of 
directors is interested in the contract and the minority shareholders object 
to the contract, the d irector will be liable to account unless he can 
establish th e  reasonableness and fairness of the contract. One circum­
stance often overlooked but which probably gives rise to the application 
of section 77 is the issue by the corporation o f shares to the majority 
shareholder. Even if the articles of incorporation remove the statutory 
pre-emptive rights set out in section 27 of the New Act, a subscription 
and allotment of shares is a contract44 in respect of which the director 
could be accountable. The CBCA, like the Old Act, does not deal with 
accountability, so for federally incorporated companies it may be neces­
sary to obtain shareholder ratification to avoid accountability.
The New Act saves the interested director or officer from account­
ability if a majority of the votes cast by disinterested shareholders are in 
favour o f approving the contract.45 However, in a one-man company or 
a family-owned company, the interested director may be unable to avoid 
liability to account because of the absence of any disinterested sharehold­
ers. The Bird Report46 recommended that this difficulty for one-man 
companies be handled by perm itting the interested director who was also 
the beneficial owner of all the outstanding shares in the corporation to 
be counted in the quorum  and to vote at the directors’ meeting that 
considered the contract. The director would still not be relieved from 
the onus of establishing that the contract was reasonable and fair to the 
corporation because there would be no quorum of disinterested share­
holders to ratify the contract. The provisions of the New Act do not 
even go this far; they leave a trap for the vendor of shares of one-man 
companies or family companies unless appropriate indemnities are ob­
tained.
The other consequence of non-disclosure of interest by a director or 
officer is that the contract may be set aside. Like the CBCA47, the New 
Act provides that the C ourt may set aside the contract upon application 
of a shareholder or the corporation but the circumstances in which the
"Ibtd., at s. 77(8).
44F.W. Wegenast, The Law of Canadian Companies, (Toronto: The Carswell Company Limited, 1979) at 295.
4,See s. 77(9) of the New Act. U nder The Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 54, s. 134(5), 
accountability can be avoided by a two-thirds vote of the shareholders (counting the interested share­
holders) as long as the director was acting honesdy and in good faith.
‘‘Richard W. Bird, Report on Company Law, February 1975, prepared for Company Law Project. Law 
Reform Division. Department o f Justice, Province of New Brunswick, (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Bird Report”), 195.
47Supra. footnote 7, at s 115(8).
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court may intervene are ambiguously stated.48 U nder the CBCA the 
precondition to court intervention is that the director or officer fail to 
disclose his interest in accordance with the section but the New Act gives 
the court jurisdiction if the director or officer “fails to comply” with the 
section. This may put a heavier onus on the New Brunswick director or 
officer as compliance with section 77 goes beyond mere disclosure; if the 
director or officer wants to avoid accountability he must either obtain 
confirmation or approval from a majority of disinterested shareholders 
or establish that the contract was reasonable and fair to the corporation 
at the time it was approved by the directors. Does failure to comply with 
the steps necessary to establish that the contract was reasonable and fair 
to the corporation constitute a failure to comply with “this section” 
notwithstanding that shareholder ratification has been given and the 
director or officer is not accountable?49
It should be noted that section 77 o f the New Act is so drawn that 
the only sure way for the director to enjoy what limits of liability there 
are is to proceed by means o f a m eeting ra ther than by a signed 
resolution.50
Insider Trading
The draftsmen of the New Act have attempted to fill all the gaps 
perceived in the kind of insider trading rules set out in the CBCA in 
one deceptively simple paragraph. While there are no insider disclosure 
requirements under the New Act other than those relating' to contracts 
with the corporation, the civil liability imposed by section 83 is far more 
extensive, on its face, than that set forth in sub-section 125 (5) of the 
CBCA. The principal difference between the two provisions is that the 
New Act removes any requirem ent that the insider “make use” of con­
fidential information.
Section 83 of the New Act is derived from the wording used in an 
Ontario Bill, predecessor to The Securities Act, 1980  of O ntario51, which 
was designed to extend the civil liability to “tippees”, or persons who 
took advantage of “tips” received from insiders, as well as those tradi­
tionally thought of as insiders.
In the Bird Report the test now contained in section 83 of the New 
Act was favoured because it was thought to avoid “the problem of trying 
to define insiders and ‘tippees’, yet it seems to have sufficient clarity and
"Section 77 of the New Act deals with the duty of disclosure, the circumstances in which accountability
may be avoided, and the jurisdiction o f the Court to set aside the contract.
‘•See section “Signed Resolution,” supra.
•'R.S.O., 1980, c. 466. The predecessor bill was Bill 75 (4th Se*. 29th Legis. June 1974).
*‘Supra, footnote 1, at s. 77(8).
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certainty, coupled with a degree of flexibility, to be an effective means 
o f dealing with the problem of inside trad ing”.52 The Bird Report 
adopted the provision as one that meets the criteria established by the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in the Cady, Roberts case53:
“Analytically, the obligation [of insiders to disclose inside information before 
trading with outsiders or to refrain from trading] rests on two principal 
elelments; first; the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indi­
rectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose 
and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfair­
ness involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it 
is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing . . .  Thus our task here is to 
identify those persons who are in a special relationship with a company and 
privy to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in 
its securities. Intimacy demands restraint lest the uninformed be exploited."
It is doubtful whether section 83 of the New Act adequately describes 
the relationship that makes a person an insider or that liability is re­
stricted to those who take advantage of the insider information knowing 
it is unavailable to the outsider.
The relevant provisions of the CBCA54 and the New Act may be 
summarized as fellows:
CBCA New Act
Insider” the corporation, its directors,
officers, employees, affiliates, 
10% shareholders and profes­
sional advisers, “tippees”, di­
r e c to r s  an d  o f f ic e r s  o f  a 
company in which the corpo­
ration is an insider or o f  a 
company that is an insider o f  
the corporation
a person  who buys or sells 
shares or debt obligations o f  
the corporation with knowl­
ed ge o f  a m aterial fact or 
change not known to the ven­
dor or purchaser (“outsider”) 
acquired directly or indirectly 
by virtue o f a relationship to 
the corporation
T ransaction  in connection with any trans­
action in the shares or debt 
obligations o f  the corporation 
or iis affiliates
sale or purchase o f shares or 
debt obligations o f the corpo­
ration
i3ln thr Mattrr o f Cady, Robtrb & Co., Jennings Sc Marsh, Securities Regulation (1968), 869, per Cary, 
Chairman.
“ T here  is also a subsection of section 125 of the CBCA that extend« ihe defi’-.iucr» o f “insider” to 
include directors and officers of corporations that enter into business combinations with the principal
corporation.
S1Supra. footnote 46, at 187.
i *Supra, footnote 7, at s. 125 as amended by S.C. 1978-79, c. 9, s. 38.
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Information specific confidential informa- 
or Knowledge tion that if generally known 
might reasonably be expected 
to affect materially the value 
of the security
Wrongful Act makes use o f the information 
(described above) for his own 
benefit or advantage in con­
nection with the transaction
knowledge o f a material fact 
or change with respect to the 
corporation acquired by virtue 
o f a relationship to the cor­
poration that was not known 
to the purchaser or vendor
sells or purchases while having 





a) to compensate any person 
for any direct loss suffered by 
that person as a result o f the 
transaction and
b) to account to the corpora­
tion for any direct benefit or 
advantage received or receiv­
able by the insider as a result 
o f the transaction
with respect to (a) above, no 
liability if the information was 
known or in the exercise of 
reasonable d iligence should  
have been known to the per­
son who suffered the loss
two years after discovery of the 
facts that gave rise to the cause 
of action
to compensate the vendor or 
purchaser of such securities for 
any loss suffered as a result of 
such trade
no liability if the ‘‘insider" has 
reasonable grounds to believe 
that the person who suffered 
the loss did have knowledge of 
the material fact or change or 
if such person did in fact have 
such knowledge
no limitation period specified 
in the New Act
It has been argued that “non-disclosure of the material fact by an 
insider to an outsider with whom he trades will prejudice the outsider 
whether or not the insider can be said to make use of the information”58 
and that “if it is material, one may assume that the outsider would not 
have traded on the same terms had he known the information”57.
This argum ent is made in support of insider liability in cases where 
no clear evidence exists of an intention on the part of the insider to take 
advantage of his inside information or confidential relationship. But the 
premise that trading without full disclosure of all material facts amounts 
to exploitation of the uninform ed58 does not hold where the outsider
“ Buckley, "How to Do Things with Inside Information," (1977-78) 2 C.B.L.J. 343 at 359. 
%*Supra, footnote 46, at 187.
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has means at his disposal to assess the value of the security he is acquiring 
from or selling to the insider.
In the common purchase and sale transaction involving all or a large 
block o f shares o f a closely-held company, the purchaser traditionally 
bargains with the vendor as to the extent of the vendor’s ultimate liability 
for undisclosed inside information. The amount o f the purchase price 
may, in some cases, be affected by the nature and scope o f representa­
tions and warranties the vendor is willing to make about the business 
and affairs o f the company and, in many such transactions, the timing 
o f payment o f the purchase price will be affected by the time the 
purchaser anticipates he will need to assure himself of the accuracy of 
the representations.
Rarely in a private share purchase transaction between parties with 
equal bargaining power would a vendor agree to assume the open-ended 
liability described in section 83 of the New Act. In such a case the 
purchaser is expected to be diligent in reviewing the financial and 
corporate books and records ana other information of the company 
whose shares he is purchasing; beyond that, he himself determines what 
is material and seeks representations o r warranties from the vendor 
concerning those matters.
Unlike the market for publicly-traded securities the market for shares 
of a private company is very much a matter of negotiation. The price 
and the other terms of the purchase agreement will vary with the extent 
of the vendor’s continuing liability to the purchaser for breach of rep ­
resentations and warranties. Section 83, in effect, adds a statutory war­
ranty to purchase agreements involving the shares or debt of a company 
governed by the New Act which are to be sold by an insider. In contrac­
tual terms it might be stated as follows:
“The vendor represents and warrants to the purchaser (such representation 
and warranty to survive closing) that he has no knowledge of any material 
fact or change with respect to the corporation that has not been disclosed to 
the purchaser.”5®
While such a clause might be acceptable to a vendor in some circum­
stances, it will be a source of surprise and annoyance to vendors who are 
accustomed to negotiating the terms of the warranties they give. Solicitors 
for vendors (of either shares or debt) will be well advised to consider 
stipulating in purchase agreements for a waiver by the purchaser of his 
rights under section 83 and an acknowledgment that the purchaser is 
relying solely on the representations and warranties in the agreement 
and on his own purchase investigation.
**</. Canadian Corporation Precedents, Vol. 2, R.A. Davies, Editor (2nd edition—1975) 8-30, clause 4.41, 
which is a standard form representation for share purchase agreements, sometimes called a “hunter 
clause”. This kind of clause rarely survives the negotiations intact.
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The exception from liability contained in section 83 differs from the 
exception in the CBCA in that the insider may be liable even if the 
outsider, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, ought to have known of 
the material fact because, under section 83, the insider must have rea­
sonable grounds to believe that the person who suffered the loss actually 
did have knowledge of the material fact or change. Disclosure is therefore 
essential on the part o f the insider but, especially in respect of closely- 
held companies, what must be disclosed will depend on the meaning of 
the words “material fact or change”. There is no definition of “material” 
in the New Act and an interpretation based on market price or market 
value would be inappropriate in many cases because of the narrow market 
for the securities of closely-held companies. To say that a fact is material 
because, if generally known, it might reasonably be expected to affect 
materially the market value of the securities60 is to apply a public com­
pany test in a jurisdiction where there frequently will be no market other 
than the special purchaser.
In order to decide whether to make the disclosure, abandon the 
transaction or stipulate for a waiver of section 83, the insider will require 
a definition of materiality that can be applied to special purchasers. At 
least some assessment of his position could be made if the material fact 
were taken to be one that the insider reasonably expected would mate­
rially affect the price or terms on which the outsider (or outsiders in his 
position) would be willing to complete the transaction.
The knowledge necessary to found liability under section 83 of the 
New Act must be acquired by virtue of a relationship to the corporation. 
“Relationship” is a word virtually empty of meaning by itself. A purposive 
construction of section 83 would suggest that the relationship referred 
to is one other than the relationship o f competitor, supplier, minority 
shareholder or other person not in a position to acquire information of 
a confidential sort intended only for the purposes of the corporation, 
albeit a person in a “relationship” to the corporation. It is odd that the 
draftsmen of the New Act should go to such extremes in sub-section 
25(15) to define the word “related” where a simple cross-reference to 
the Income Tax Act would have sufficed for the purpose o f that section61, 
while in section 83 no assistance whatever is provided.
Assuming all the other pre-requisites are met, the insider is obliged 
to compensate the outsider for any loss suffered by the outsider as a 
result of the trade. The comparable provision of the CBCA confines the 
liability to direct loss. Unlike the New Act, the CBCA requires, in 
addition, that the insider account to the corporation for benefits received.
**cf. CBCA, supra, footnote 7, at s. 125(5).
“ T he purpose o f the definition in section 25(15) of the New Act is to explain what persons are deemed 
not to deal at arm 's length with the corporation which is, in turn, necessary for the determination o f 
stated capital under s. 25(4). cf. CBCA, supra, footnote 7, at s. 25(1.2), and see the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 
1952, c. 148, as amended, s. 251(2).
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According to the Bird Report62, the original rationale for thus making 
the insider accountable to the corporation and imposing double liability 
was to ensure that even if the outsider did not know of his rights or 
could not afford to sue the insider, the corporation could prevent the 
insider from keeping the fruits of his abuse of confidential information. 
The Bird Report recommended against requiring the insider to account, 
suggesting that in closely-held companies, as opposed to public compa­
nies, the outsider would be more likely to pursue his remedy on his own.
There is no specific limitation period for bringing actions under the 
New Act so, presumably, the general six-year period for claims will 
apply.63 The CBCA fixes a two-year limitation period for actions by 
outsiders against insiders under section 125.
In short, traders in securities of New Brunswick corporations must 
henceforth be extremely cautious. As consumer protection legislation, 
section 83 of the New Act is a half-measure; its application will be 
arbitrary64 because it covers only bodies corporate incorporated or con­
tinued under the New Act and not, for instance, companies incorporated 
under CBCA or the laws of other provinces.65 It is to be hoped that the 
courts will interpret section 83 in such a way that it does not frustrate 
transactions negotiated at arms length between purchasers and vendors 
of equal bargaining power.
Directors' Liabilities
Section 79(1) of the New Act restates what has come to be accepted 
as the directors’ two-pronged duty—a duty to be honest and a duty to 
be reasonably diligent and skilful. Section 117 o f the CBCA is virtually
"B ird  Report, supra, footnote 46, at 189.
"Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. L-8, s.9. The six years run from the date the cause o f action 
arose.
*4S.N.B. 1981, c. B-9.1, s. 1(1) (definition o f “corporation”). If section 83 were extended to apply to 
federally incorporated companies there is some doubt whether the legislation would be constitutionally 
valid in respect o f such companies. In Multiple Access Limited v. McCutcheon et al. 11 O.R. (2d) 249 (High 
Ct.); 16 O R. (2d) 593 (Div. Ct.); 19 O  R (2d) 516 note (C.A.); 24 N.R. 358 (S.C.C.) leave to appeal 
granted, the Ontario Court o f Appeal dismissed an appeal from the decision of the Divisional Court 
holding that the insider trading liability provisions of Ontario legislation were rendered inoperative 
with respect to federally incorporated companies by virtue o f the existence of identical provisions of the 
Canadian Corporations Act. T he decision was based on the paramountcy doctrine (see Home Iru. Co. of 
New York v. Lmdal and Beattie [1934] S.C.R. 33; cf. Robinson v. Countrywide Factors Lid. (1977) 72 D.L.R. 
500 (S.C.C.)). But the court placed considerable weight on the fact the federal and provincial statutory 
provisions were identical (see 16 O.R. (2d) 593 at 598) which is not the case with section 83 of the New 
Act and the provisions of the CBCA. Moreover, on appeal to the Supreme Court o f Canada in the 
McCutcheon case, supra, (heard on November 25, 1981; judgm ent reserved) the Ontario Securities 
Commission which had in the lower courts conceded the constitutional validity of the provisional 
legislation argued that the federal provisions in issue were ultra vires the Parliament of Canada (see John 
Deere Plow Company v. Wharton [1915] A.C. 330).
"Ibid.
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identical. The duty is imposed by both the New Act and the CBCA on 
officers as well as directors. In addition, the directors are required by 
sub-section 79(2) to comply with the Act, the regulations, the articles, by­
laws and any unanimous shareholder agreement. This duty can be en­
forced by the court on the application o f a shareholder, a creditor, an 
officer, a director or even the owner o f a share in an affiliate of the 
corporation.66 The derivative action, brought by a shareholder or other 
complaintant on behalf of the corporation, provides an alternative rem ­
edy. 7
A director who votes for or consents to certain im proper or prohib­
ited payments or transactions is liable to compensate the corporation or 
to restore the payment and make good the shortfall. The prohibited 
transactions are set out in section 76 o f the New Act and may be 
summarized as follows:
— issue of a share for less than the fair equivalent of a money consideration;
— purchase, redemption or acquisition of the corporation’s own shares when 
the corporation is insolvent (as defined in the Act);
— payment of an unreasonable commission to procure the purchase of the 
corporation’s shares;
— payment of a dividend when the corporation is insolvent (as defined in 
the Act);
— granting financial assistance to shareholders, directors or employees or 
their associates when the corporation is insolvent or to anyone in connec­
tion with the purchase of the corporation’s shares (with specified excep­
tions);
— payment of an indemnity to a director or officer except as permitted by 
section 81;
— payment to a dissenting shareholder or to a shareholder who has invoked 
the oppression remedy (section 166) when the corporation is insolvent.
A director is not liable for the issue o f a share at less than its fair 
equivalent of money consideration if he proves he did not know and 
could not reasonably have known that the share was issued for a consid­
eration less than such fair equivalent.68 In all the cases listed above, the 
director’s liability cannot be enforced by action commenced more than 
two years after the date of the resolution approving the prohibited 
transaction.69
As in sub-section 118(4) of the CBCA, a director (but not an officer) 
is relieved from liability under the New Act for breach of his duties to 
act with care, diligence and skill in the best interests of the corporation
**Ib%d., at ss. 172, 16S and infra, footnote 106.
*T/W ., at s. 164.
-Ibtd., at s. 76(6).
**lbid., at s. 76(7).
122 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL •  REVUE DE DROIT U.N.-B.
and his duties not to consent to the prohibited transactions referred to 
above, if he relied in good faith on financial statements of the corporation 
(if they were represented to him by an officer or in a written report of 
the auditor as fairly reflecting the financial condition o f the corporation) 
or on the report of a professional adviser where the adviser’s profession 
lends credibility to a statement m ade.70 It should be noted that a share­
holder can assume the duties of a director and to that extent relieve the 
director from liability in cases where there is a unanimous shareholder 
agreem ent.71
The corporation may indemnify its directors and officers against 
costs and charges incurred in most lawsuits against them resulting from 
acts done in their official capacities as long as they acted honestly and in 
good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation.72 In the 
case of legal proceedings involving a fine, the director or officer must, 
in addition, have had reasonable grounds for believing his conduct was 
lawful.73 The director or officer is entitled to indemnity if he satisfied 
these requirements and was substantially successful on the merits of his 
defence and was fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnity. Insurance 
against the liabilities o f the director or officer for which he may be 
indemnified by the corporation may be purchased by the corporation.
Information for Shareholders
U nder section 100 o f the New Act the directors are required to 
place before the shareholders at each annual meeting comparative finan­
cial statements together with the report of the auditor thereon if an 
auditor has been appointed and, not less than twenty-one days before 
the annual meeting, the corporation must send the financial statements 
to each shareholder o f the corporation unless the shareholder has in­
formed the corporation in writing that he does not want a copy of the 
financial statements.74 Shareholders and their agents and legal represen­
tatives are entitled to inspect the annual financial statements o f the 
corporation and its subsidiaries upon request and make extracts free of 
charge provided the corporation has not after receiving the request 
obtained a court order barring such inspection on the ground that the 
examination would be detrimental to the corporation or a subsidiary.75 
That is the extent of the financial disclosure required by the New Act.
70lbid, at s. 80(3).
"Ibid., at s. 99(5).
7tlbid., at s. 81(1).
7*Ibid., at s. 81(1) (b).
7*lbid., at s. 103(1).
7tlbtd., at &s. 101(2) & 101(3).
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Sub-section 87(5) requires that the notice of a meeting of sharehold­
ers at which special business is to be transacted include the text of any 
special resolution to be submitted to the meeting and state the nature of 
the business in sufficient detail to permit the shareholder to form a 
reasoned judgm ent thereon. This is probably no more onerous than the 
common law rule referred to by Mr. Justice Spence in Garuie v. Axmith76 
to the effect that the notice must provide sufficient information for the 
shareholder to come to an intelligent conclusion as to whether he should 
support or oppose the resolution.
Shareholders are entitled to inspect the articles, by-laws, unanimous 
shareholder agreement, minutes ~/f shareholders’ meetings, the share­
holders’ and directors’ registers77 and the shareholders’ list.78 These 
records are generally the same as those required to be kept under the 
Old Act. Furtherm ore, as under the Old Act, a company that is author­
ized to do so by its articles may, in effect, remove the names of all the 
shareholders from its share register by issuing bearer share warrants 
entitling the bearers to the shares specified in the warrants.79
The New Act imposes no proxy solicitation requirements nor is a 
management proxy circular required in connection with the solicitation 
of proxies for meetings o f shareholders.80 However, the corporation 
must send a shareholder “proposal” and any accompanying statement of 
the shareholder with the notice o f an annual meeting provided the 
conditions set forth in sub-section 89(5) are met. Similarly, where an 
auditor resigns or action is taken to remove him he is entitled to submit 
a statement explaining his resignation o r opposing his removal which 
must be sent by the corporation to shareholders.81
Banking and Borrowing
The requirem ent of a by-law authorizing the directors to borrow 
that was contained in section 81 of the Old Act is absent from the New 
Act.
U nder the Old Act there was always some doubt about the validity 
of “up-stream” guarantees because the list of incidental powers conferred 
on companies incorporated under the Old Act appeared to prevent a 
subsidiary from guaranteeing the obligations of its parent unless there
T*( 1962) O  R. 65.
**cf Part xii o f the CBCA, supra,, footnote 7, at s. 144(1) (d) 
*'Supra, footnote 1, at ss. 109(5), 109(6).
77Supra, footnote 1, at 5.19(1).
7llbtd, at s. 90(4).
7,/W „ at s. 51(5).
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were “business relations” between them .82 It was common to specifically 
authorize a subsidiary to guarantee its paren t’s obligations in the letters 
patent of incorporation. The New Act enables directors of the corpora­
tion, without the authorization of the shareholders, to give a guarantee 
on behalf of the corporation to secure performance of an obligation of 
any person83 and to delegate those powers to a director or officer.84
The New Act retains and modifies in some respects the rules pro­
hibiting a corporation from borrowing o r giving guarantees or financial 
assistance in connection with the purchase o f its own shares. It was a 
corollary o f the common law rule85 prohibiting a company from traffick­
ing in its own shares that it could not make loans or give financial 
assistance to facilitate the purchase o f its shares. This principal was given 
statutory sanction in section 38 o f the Old Act and appears in section 42 
o f the CBCA and section 43 of the New Act. These provisions are a 
serious hurdle to takeovers. Often the only means a suitor has of financ­
ing the takeover of a target company is by using the assets of the target 
company to secure the purchase price.88
The CBCA permits the target company to give financial assistance 
if the realizable value o f the target-company’s assets (excluding the assets 
used to give the assistance), after giving the financial assistance, would 
equal or exceed the liabilities and capital of the target company. It is 
also permissible, without satisfying a solvency test, for a corporation to 
give financial assistance in connection with the purchase of its own shares 
if the assistance is given to a parent company of which the target company 
is a “wholly-owned subsidiary”.87 However, it is arguable that a target 
company is not a wholly-owned subsidiary if the parent company becomes 
the holding body corporate as a result o f the very transaction for which 
the financial assistance is given.
The New Act is more restrictive than the CBCA in that even if the 
target company would be “solvent” after the assistance was given, finan­
cial assistance in connection with the purchase of its own shares is 
prohibited88 unless one of the exceptions applies. As with the CBCA the
•*Supra, footnote 3, at s. 14(1 )(g).
**Supra, footnote 1, at s. 61(6) (c).
“ Ibid., at s. 61(7).
**Trevor v. Whitworth (1887), 12 App. Cas. 409 (H.L.); Common v. McArthur (1898), 29 S.C.R. 239; Zwicker 
v. Stanbury, (1954) 1 D.L.R. 257(S.C.C.).
"F o r  a recent example of an unsuccessful attempt to finance an acquisition in this way see Central and 
Eastern T 'js t Company v. Irving Oil Limited and Stone house Motel and Restaurant Lmited (1980) 31 N.R. 593 
(S.C.C.).
Supra, fo jtnote 7, at s. 42(2) (c).
%%Supra, footnote 1, at s. 43(2)(b).
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m eaning of “wholly-owned subsidiary” is not clear. Does it include a 
company all of whose shares are owned by two companies that are in 
turn  wholly-owned by one ultimate parent company?
The Old Act prohibited loans to shareholders or directors except in 
certain narrowly defined circumstances.89 The New Act abandons that 
position by perm itting such loans subject to a solvency test. Moreover, 
even this restraint can be removed with an appropriate provision in the 
articles.90
The Decision to Continue Under the New Act
During the period between January 1, 1982 and January 1, 198791, 
the officers, directors and shareholders of companies incorporated under 
the Oíd Act will have to direct their minds to the advantages and 
disadvantages o f voluntarily continuing the company under the New Act. 
The decision should be carefully considered as it is an irrevocable step.92
The mechanics o f continuing under the New Act are simpler than 
those involved in obtaining supplementary letters patent under the Old 
Act because no affidavits are required. The company need only file three 
form s93 (Articles o f Continuance, Notice o f Directors and Notice of 
Registered Office). It will also be essential to pass a new general by-law 
that corresponds to the New Act.
There are two alternative procedures for continuing an existing New 
Brunswick company under the New Act. If no changes are to be made 
to the letters patent of the company upon continuance, other than an 
amendm ent required to conform to the New Act, the directors of the 
company may authorize the continuance without a shareholders’ meet­
ing.94 This would be done by resolution, passed in accordance with the 
by-laws of the company, authorizing the application for a certificate of 
continuance and naming someone to sign the necessary forms.
If amendments are to be made to the letters patent upon continuance 
the shareholders must approve the continuance by two-thirds majority 
o f the voting shares.95 Changes may only be made in accordance with 
the limits prescribed by the New Act.96 However there is no right of
**Supra, footnote 3, at s. 38(1).
,#Supra, footnote 1, at s. 43(1); cf. CBCA, supra footnote 7, at s. 42, which does not permit the solvency 
test to be overridden by the articles unless the case falls within the exceptions.
1'Supra, footnote 5 and 6 and text.
**Supra, footnote 1, at s. 192(6).
“ Ibid., at s. 126(2).
**Ibtd., at s. 192(4).
“ Ibid., at s. 192(2)(a).
“ Ibid., at s. I92(2)(b).
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dissent on continuance.®7 The shareholder’s right to dissent would, if it 
applied, give the shareholder the right to be paid the fair value of the 
shares in respect of which he dissents.98 After continuance, the right 
arises if, for example, amendments to the share capital are proposed or 
if the corporation resolves to amalgamate, to change the restrictions on 
its business, to sell, lease or exchange all or substantially all its property 
or to provide for meetings outside New Brunswick.
Until January 1, 1984 companies governed by the Old Act may still 
apply for supplementary letters p a ten t"  under that Act (including letters 
patent o f amalgamation).100 Examples of changes that one might prefer 
to make under the Old Act are change o f nam e101 (because only a simple 
majority o f the shareholders need approve it compared to two-thirds 
majority under the New Act); amalgamation102 (because there are no 
shareholder dissenting rights, no separate class votes, no declaration of 
solvency and no requirem ent o f notice to creditors—but the requisite 
majority is three-quarters under the Old Act as opposed to two-thirds 
under the New Act); and removal of a director103 (because the New Act 
has more extensive cumulative voting).
If the company’s shares or debt may be sold in the next five years 
it might be wise to remain under the Old Act in order to avoid the 
insider trading liability.104 If there are potential claims by shareholders 
against the directors for oppressive or unfair acts105 the Old Act is a 
safer haven. Disgruntled minority shareholders (both past and present) 
and unhappy creditors have considerably more ammunition under the 
New Act.106
"Ibid., at s. 192(5).
••Ibid , at s. 131(3).
••Supra, footnote 4.
,#0T he definition o f “supplementary letters patent" in section 2(1) o f the Old Act includes any letters 
patent granted to a company subsequent to the letters patent incorporating the company. This would 
include letters patent o f amalgamation because the amalgamating companies are not extinguished: R. 
v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co. Ltd., (1975) 1 S.C.R. 411; and Witco v. The Corporation of Oakville, 
(1975) 1 S.C.R. 273.
‘• ‘Supra, footnote 3, at s. 33; cf. New Act, supra, footnote 7, at s. 113( 1 )(d).
‘••Ibid., at s. 31; rf. New Act, at s. 120.
'••Ibid., at s. 92; cf.. New Act, at s. 65.
'••Supra, footnote 1 at s. 83, and see section “Insider Trading", supra.
'••Ibid., at ss. 141(1 )(a), 155(2)(b) & 166(2).
‘®*The definition of “ complainant” in section 163 of the New Act includes a registered holder or 
beneficial owner, o r a form er registered holder o r beneficial owner, o f a share o f the corporation o r 
any of its affiliates, a director o r officer o r a form er director or officer o f a corporation o r any o f its 
affiliates, a creditor o f the corporation, the director, o r any o ther person who, in the discretion o f the 
Court, is a proper person to make an application under Part XV.
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Even some of the obvious benefits of the New Act can be achieved 
under the Old Act by circuitous and sometimes more favourable means. 
For instance, a result analagous to the purchase by a company of its 
common shares may be achieved by reduction o f capital107 under the 
Old Act without satisfying a solvency test. It is sometimes desirable for 
investment or income tax purposes for a company to hold shares in its 
parent company. There are more defensible means of accomplishing this 
result under the Old Act than under the New Act.108
On the other hand, if the company is closely-held and not likely to 
be involved in shareholder disputes the advantages of the New Act are 
obvious. Indeed, even if disputes between minority and majority share­
holders are foreseen, with careful planning, important changes to the 
capital and management structure o f the company may be made upon 
continuance without giving minority shareholders any rights to dissent.109 
Measures can be adopted on continuance to authorize unlimited capital110, 
change the size o f the  b o a rd 111, perm it short notice sha reho lders’ 
meetings112, exclude pre-emptive rights113, permit loans to shareholders 
without passing the solvency test114 and to limit the effect of cumulative 
voting.115 A new general by-law could be adopted at the same time and 
the number o f votes required to change the by-law fixed by the articles 
at a figure higher than a bare majority.116
Although it is by no means clear117, section 2(5) o f the New Act 
appears to provide a means to “grandfather” provisions o f the letters 
patent o f existing companies. The sub-section states, inter alia, that:—
"‘’Supra, footnote 3, at s. 64.
'••T here is no express prohibition in the Old Act against a company acquiring o r holding shares of its 
parent company. At common law the Trevor v. Whitworth (supra, footnote 85) prohibition may not extend 
to a purchase for investment by a subsidiary o f shares of its parent: Praxne Realty Ltd. v. J.M. Sinclair 
Co. Lid. (1967), 63 D.L.R. (2d) 555 (Sask.); cf Schtowitx et al. v. I.O.S. Ltd. et ai.. (1971) 3 O R. 684. 
U nder the New Act the prohibition is explicit, albeit subject to a gradual divestment rule and some 
minor exceptions: s. 29. Quaere whether section 2(5) of the New Act may be used to delay the application 
o f section 29 to continued companies: see infra, footnote 117, and text.
'"Supra, footnote 1, at ss.l92(2)(b), 192(5).
" • I b i d at s. 113( 1 )(</)■
Ibid., at s. 113(l)(n).
'" Ik d ., at ss. 113(1) & 87(1).
"*Ibid., at ss. 113(1) Sc 27.
" 4/bid., at ss. 113(1) & 43(1).
"'Supra, footnotes 15 to 18 and text.
footnote 1, at s. 4(3).
M,An official of the Department of Justice indicated to the writer that section 2(5) o f the New Act was 
intended to ensure that certain extended powers o f some companies incorporated by special Act not be 
lost on continuance. An example might be the power to expropriate granted to a company incorporated 
by Special Act.
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“Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, where a body corporate 
incorporated under letters patent. . .  is continued or deemed to have been 
continued under this Act, any provisions in the letters patent. . .  or supple­
mentary letters patent..  . which are valid immediately before the coming into 
force of this Act continue to be valid and to have effect, but any amendments 
thereto shall be made in accordance with this Act.”
Quaere: whether supplementary letters patent stipulating that the election 
o f directors shall be staggered over two years118, that there shall be no 
cumulative voting11* except in accordance with section 92 of the Old Act 
and  that d irec to rs may be rem oved by o rd in a ry  reso lu tion  o f the 
shareholders120 (all o f which would be inconsistent with the New Act) 
would be valid and continue to have effect after continuance notwith­
standing the New Act.
It is evident that there are many factors to be considered in deciding 
when to continue a company under the New Act. The following table 
contains a somewhat over-simplified comparison of some of the differ­
ences between the Old Act, the New Act and the CBCA; it is intended 
as a rem inder that the differences are numerous and varied and not as 
a substitute for careful study o f the respective acts.
' 19lbtd., at s. 67(1), which provides for removal of a director by ordinary resolution o f the shareholders 
and is expressly subject to the limitation on removal set out in section 65(6) o f the New Act.
"*Supra, footnote 15.
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months of by-law
— amalgamation letters patent of amalgamation: %
vote of shareholders of amalgam­
ating companies, companies must 
have same or similar objects
New Act CBCA
not less than 21 days or more than not less than 21 days or more than 
50 days unless articles or unani- 50 days 
mous shareholder agreement oth­
erwise provides
shareholders may propose by-law for same as New Act except that share- 
annual meeting; shareholders rep- holders representing 5% of votes 
resenting 10% of votes may requis- may requisition meeting 
ition shareholders’ meeting
unanimous shareholder agreement may restrict 
powers of directors
not required, specified rights and required except in special circum- 
duties if appointed stances
articles o f amendment by special same as New Act except no time 
resolution shareholder vote), period for sending to Director 
separate class votes in many cases, 
to be sent to Director within 3 
months of resolution
articles o f amalgamation: % vote o f shareholders of 
all classes (even if non-voting shares), dissenting 
shareholder may be entitled to fair value o f his 
shares
— declaration of solvency and notice to creditor 
provisions



















— change of 
name
— extraordinary 













supplementary letters patent con­
firming majority vote of sharehold­
ers





— by Minister for inactivity or non­
payment of annual fees
— by Court under Winding-up Act 
on application of shareholder or 
creditor on grounds:—majority 
vote of shareholders, just and 
equitable, impairment of capital, 
mismanagement
governed by common law
restricted common law right
Part VII
articles of amendment: h  vote of shareholders
New Act CBCA
special resolution, (fa shareholder vote) all shares 
vote
right to be paid fair value of shares in case of certain 
changes
offeror who acquires 90% of shares of company 
may force out remaining shareholders
— by Director for inactivity or failure to File or pay 
fees.
— by Court on application of Director or interested 
person for non-compliance with disclosure to 
shareholder provisions, procuring certificate by 
misrepresentation, not holding annual meetings 
for 2 years
— by Court on application o f shareholder on 
grounds—oppression of shareholder, creditor, 
director, officer or pursuant to unanimous share­
holder agreement, or just and equitable
Part VIII
wide group of complainants may institute action on 























oppression rem- no statutory provision 
edy
Old Act




complainant may apply to court for order on grounds 
corporation or its affiliates or management has acted 
oppressively, or unfairly to shareholder, creditor, 
director, officer
complainant may apply for order compelling person 
to comply with Act
N
.B
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